Originally published in Slingshot issue 287, March/April 2013
– the magazine of the Society of Ancients
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Moorish troops and servants, Las Cantigas de Santa Maria, 13th century AD |
Prelude
After
the death of King Wittiza in 708 AD, the Visigothic nobility was once again divided
in two factions. One faction supported
Wittiza's son Agila and the other one supported Roderic. The latter faction would eventually gain the
upper hand. What happened precisely,
however, is exceedingly obscure and it is possible that the ruling elite had
split, with Agila ruling in the north and Roderic in the south.
Contemporary chronicles report that Hispania was destroyed by the attacks of the Arabs and by “internal fury”. Moreover, a number of crop failures, and consequent famines, combined with the plague in 707 and 709 AD had taken a toll on society. The resulting radically decreased commerce and income ruined innumerable men. Additionally, slaves were fleeing in droves and Jews were being persecuted. It is very likely that also the Visigothic army suffered from this general desolate state of affairs.
Contemporary chronicles report that Hispania was destroyed by the attacks of the Arabs and by “internal fury”. Moreover, a number of crop failures, and consequent famines, combined with the plague in 707 and 709 AD had taken a toll on society. The resulting radically decreased commerce and income ruined innumerable men. Additionally, slaves were fleeing in droves and Jews were being persecuted. It is very likely that also the Visigothic army suffered from this general desolate state of affairs.
Most of the source material for the history of
the Moorish conquest comes from the writings of Arab historians and
geographers. Several of these worked
centuries after the events they described and were not themselves natives of al-Andalus, as the Arabs called the peninsula. This name may be derived from the name Andalusia or Vandalusia, after the tribe of the Vandals,
which settled in Iberia for a short period in the fifth century AD and then
crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to colonize Northern Africa.
Like
some other Muslim conquests, the invasion of Iberia seems to have been a local
initiative, without the approval of the hierarchy, in this case Mūsā bin Nuşayr,
the governor of Ifrīqīya (North
Africa) based at al-Qayrawān
(Kairouan), in modern Tunisia. The
author of the Chronicle puts the
blame for the success of the Muslims with the ambitions of Roderic and the
treachery of King Egica’s son Oppa, who supposedly conspired with the Arabs. Also the cowardice of Archbishop Sindered of
Toledo is mentioned, who fled to Rome rather than remaining with his flock.
In
July 710 AD, the Berber commander Malik bin Tarif crossed the Strait of
Gibraltar with a reconnaissance force of 300 infantry and 100 cavalry, all
Berber units from North Africa, and landed near modern Tarifa – hence the name.
The lack of resistance to their
incursion encouraged the Muslims to organise an invasion force the following
spring.
The Moorish Conquest
In
April 711 AD, a larger Umayyad-Berber army passed the Strait from Ceuta with a
force of 4,000 infantry and 1,000 light cavalry to test the ground. It landed on the beach near modern Gibraltar under
the leadership of the Berber Tāriq bin Zeyad. Tāriq established a base camp at the foot of
the Mons Calpe, later renamed Jebal al-Tāriq – Mountain of Tāriq – and
currently known as the Rock of Gibraltar; a corruption of Jeb(a)laltar, the Arab name less the –iq; the “l” and “r” are interchangeable between
languages, cf. blanco in Spanish and branco in Portuguese.
Transport
through the strait went on for several weeks and one wonders why apparently nobody
sounded the alarm. When Tāriq felt
strong enough to venture deep into enemy territory, his men marched to Carteya (modern Algeciras). The governor of Córdoba quickly organised troops to oppose the invading army and the
forces collided somewhere along the Roman road from Córdoba to Seville, ending
in a clear defeat for the Visigoths.
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Modern aerial view of the Rock of Gibraltar |
After
this battle, a small Muslim force under Mugīth ar-Rūmī proceeded further north to
take Córdoba. The city seems to have been decrepit. The Roman bridge was broken and there was a
major hole in the ramparts, which the Moors used to enter the city. Most people had already fled and only a small
number of military men had remained in an improvised fortress inside the walls.
When they finally capitulated after
three months, they were all put to death.
In
the meantime, Tāriq had pulled his forces back to Cadiz, waiting for
reinforcements from North Africa. In May
the governor of North Africa Mūsā bin Nuşayr sent an army of Luwata Berber
forces, possibly 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, across the Strait. According to Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406 AD), of the
12,000 invaders only a maximum of 300 were Arabs, since not many Arab warriors would
have served under a non-Arab Muslim client general (mawlā) as Tāriq.
It
is noteworthy that the Caliph al-Walid bin ‘Abd al-Malik had forbidden Mūsā to
risk the lives of Arabs during the Spanish adventure. Not
only was the crossing a dangerous undertaking, but also a defeat on a
battlefield in enemy territory could prove disastrous if a quick escape had to
be made across the Strait.
Meanwhile,
King Roderic was fighting the Vascones in the area of Pamplona. Evidently this area was not ruled by Agila,
king of the north. He only heard about
the presence of the Umayyad army two or three weeks after the invasion. When Roderic’s army reached Toledo, it was
reinforced by contingents from local nobles, including Sisbert and Oppa, brothers
and loyal supporters of King Agila. Hoping
that the conflicts between the Visigothic clans could be put on hold in order
to defeat the invaders, Roderic accepted their help. The Visigothic army may have numbered up to
25,000 to 30,000 troops, some 5,000 of them cavalrymen, but this is pure guesswork.
The battle of
the Guadalete
The
exact location of the battle is unknown. Most historians agree that the battle occurred
near Arcos de la Frontera, somewhere along the river Guadalete (Wādī Lakkah in Arab chronicles), which
was dry during the summer. Roderic
formed his army according to the traditional Visigothic battle order: two
lines, with the (heavy) cavalry in front and slightly on the flanks, and the
infantry in the centre of the second line, commanded by the king. The cavalry was to breach and destroy the
enemy formation, after which the infantry could finish the job. The flanks of the army may have been commanded
by Oppa and Sisbert, but this is not certain.
The
Muslims may have combined the characteristic manoeuvres of the early Umayyad
armies with Berber tactics. In that
case, the front line would have been made up of infantry, with cavalry in the
second line and on the flanks, ready to exploit any tactical opportunity. Typical combat tactics would have been
harassing the enemy with projectiles and simulated cavalry charges and retreats
(al-karr wa-‘l-farr), followed by a
fierce charge of infantry, intended to break the enemy lines.
The
Visigoths attacked, driving back the Umayyad centre, but the slow retreat of
the Berbers was only a ruse. Tāriq had
wanted to tempt the Visigoths into focussing their attacks on the centre of his
army, so that his cavalry could push back Roderic’s flanks. It is often suggested that Oppa and Sisbert,
commanding the flanks, abandoned their king at this stage of the battle, but
this cannot be confirmed.
Whatever
happened, the Berber cavalry attacked the Visigothic flanks, while Tāriq’s
infantry launched an assault. As a
result, Roderic’s infantry in the second line fled in disarray and Roderic’s
army was destroyed, losing more than half of its men. In his History of
the Kings of al-Andalus Ahmad bin Muhammad ar-Razi reports
that of the
Muslim forces 9,000 men were left to receive any booty. If most of the total invading army was
involved in the battle, this would mean that around 40% must have perished.
Nothing
is known for certain about the fate of King Roderic himself. A reference in the Chronicle of 754 AD to his widow Egilona in ca 715 AD suggests that
he died in battle, or soon after. The Chronicle of Alfonso III (King of
Asturias from 866 to 910 AD) states that he took refuge in Lusitania and was
buried in Viseu, 100 km southeast of modern Porto, where a tombstone was found with
the inscription Rodericus Rex. Unfortunately, this tombstone has not survived
the ages, so there is no way to ascertain the truth.
Whereas
Arab sources state that the conquest was essentially the product of a single and
rather bloody battle, the Chronicle of
754 AD gives the impression that there had been considerable prior raiding
by Muslim forces from Africa. Also, the
presence of probably two Muslim armies in the peninsula for anything up to a
year before the crucial battle with Roderic is mentioned, which may have been
the breeding ground for the version that Roderic’s political opponents had
engaged the Muslims to depose the king. The Chronicle
attributes the defeat to the Visigothic army’s flight and states that this was
due to its having accompanied the king “in rivalry”, “deceitfully” and “out of ambition
for rule”.
Aftermath
Though
there are no reliable accounts on the exact course of the Muslim campaigns, it
is generally assumed that, after the victory at the Guadalete, Tāriq split his
army. One column went to Lusitania,
another stayed in the conquered city of Córdoba, while he himself marched for the
Visigothic capital of Toledo, where he spent the winter of 711-12 AD.
Hearing
the news of Tāriq’s victory and quick expansion along the Guadalquivir valley, governor
Mūsā landed either at Cadiz or Algeciras with an army of 18,000 Arabs in June
712 AD to take full control of the invasion. Instead of proceeding directly to Toledo, he
chose to occupy the towns which Tāriq had bypassed: Medina Sidonia, Carmona,
Alcalá de Guadaira and Seville. Seville
fell after a siege of a few months, but revolted after his departure, only to
be subdued again. Advancing into
Lusetania, Mūsā met with stiff resistance at Mérida, where the Visigothic
nobility held out through the winter. The
city was forced to surrender on 30 June 713 AD. In accordance with the terms of the
capitulation, the Muslims only seized the goods of the Church and of those who
had perished or fled. Then Mūsā turned to Toledo. Near Talavera he is said to
have met Tāriq, whom he struck on the head with his riding crop, upbraiding him
for insubordination and greed. Though Arab
sources on the conquest of al-Andalus sometimes flatly contradict another, the
rivalry between Tāriq and his superior Mūsā appears to be a common theme.
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Moorish cavalry, Las Cantigas de Santa Maria, 13th century AD |
At
Toledo Mūsā executed an unspecified number of members of the indigenous
aristocracy for their involvement with the brother of a former king, who had
probably been chosen or consecrated himself as king at this time. After wintering in Toledo, campaigning began
again in the spring of 714 AD, which led to the nominal subjection of Galicia
and the Ebro valley. It
is striking that after the invasion little attempt seems to have been made to
defend the cities – only Córdoba, Mérida and Seville put up any effective
defence – or to raise a second army. No-one seems to have defended Toledo, a superb
natural fortress. A partial explanation
for this might be that the sharp division in Visigothic society between
military and non-military classes prevented the non-arms-bearing part of the
population from participating in the defence of the city.
Recalled
to report on the conquest by Caliph Walīd I, Mūsā returned to Damascus in
September 714 AD, taking Tāriq with him and leaving his son ‘Abd al-‘Aziz as
governor of the newly conquered lands. In
Damascus Mūsā found that the caliph had died and had been succeeded by his
brother Sulaymān, who prosecuted him on charges of embezzlement. Stripped of his honours, Mūsā died in
ignominy. Tāriq, the hero of the Iberian
conquest, was also forgotten and died in obscurity.
Over
the next five years, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz completed
the subjugation of the western region of the peninsula. Subsequently, he conquered the north-east,
the fertile lands of the south and the Levante in the east, skilfully using a
diplomatic strategy of cooperation with the Visigothic nobility on the one hand,
and brutal acts of violence to terrorize opponents on the other. In spite of the rapid
conquest of the Iberian peninsula the Arab hold of the conquered land was
precarious, as the Muslims formed only a very small percentage of the
population. Indeed, in around 718 AD
Caliph 'Umar II is said to have seriously considered the idea of
abandoning the conquest.
The Battle of
Poitiers
After
conquering most of the Iberian peninsula, the Muslims made repeated advances
into France, taking Narbonne in 719 AD after a long siege, but failing to
capture Toulouse. The population of
Narbonne was treated harshly: the men were slaughtered and the women and
children enslaved.
In
725 AD they advanced up the Rhône valley and sacked Autun in Burgundy, before
they were driven back again. In 732 AD
they crossed the western Pyrenees at Roncesvalles and took Bordeaux, advancing
into central France. The Frankish maior domus Charles Martel (“The Hammer”)
defeated the invaders led by ‘Abd ar-Rachmān al-Ghāfiqī at modern
Moussais-la-Bataille, 22 km north of Poitiers. Charles earned his nickname as a result of
this victory. Referring to this event as
the Battle of Tours, Carey renders a detailed description of the course of this
battle in his book “Road to Manzikert”
(pp.101-7).
Traditionally,
this battle is dated to October 732 AD, but there are indications that the
battle was fought a year later. Yūsuf
bin ‘Abd ar-Rahmān took Arles shortly afterwards in 735 AD, devastating
Provence for a period of four years. In
response, Charles Martel launched a raid into western Provence in 737 AD,
taking Avignon, though he was not able to retain it. After an unsuccessful siege of Narbonne, he
withdrew, ordering the destruction of the defences of the city of Maguelone
(near Montpellier) and the amphitheatre of Nîmes.
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Charles Martel fighting 'Abd ar-Rachman al-Ghafiqi at Poitiers |
A
second raid by Charles in 738 AD was not so much directed against the Arabs as
against the most prominent of their local allies, the Duke Maurontus of
Marseille. Having taken Avignon for a
second time, he advanced on Marseille, causing the Duke to flee to a fortified
island.
After
these defeats, the Muslims did not advance further into Europe, mainly for
reasons other than military weakness. Political instability on the side of the
Moors and the economic structure of Western Europe, which yielded little
interesting and easily removable plunder, made it difficult to motivate
soldiers for campaigns in the north.
The
importance of Poitiers has often been exaggerated; it was no Waterloo. The Arabs felt no compulsion – religious or
otherwise – to conquer western Christendom in the name of Islam. “To them Europe seemed remarkably
unattractive, with few opportunities to trade, little booty and a terrible
climate” (Armstrong, Islam, A Short
History, p. 44). The defeat near Poitiers did, however, signal the
beginning of end of the booty economy of the Muslim Iberian peninsula, as the
pressure on resources in al-Andalus could no longer be relieved by raiding into
Francia. Instead, the Iberian Muslims
were obliged to live off the resources of the peninsula. Competition for revenues and status would soon
give rise to savage feuds.
Resistance
The
general lack of resistance that the invaders met with during their conquest may
be based on the fact that the invasion was originally taken for another
transient Moorish raid. Roderic’s
opponents may have hoped that the invaders would defeat the king and depart,
leaving them in charge.
The
centralised character of the kingdom may have facilitated the rapid conquest of
Iberia, similar to the situation of Anglo-Saxon England in 1066 AD. Had it been divided into numerous local
lordships and principalities, these would no doubt have put up strong
resistance. However, the defeat of the
royal army at the Guadalete left the entire Peninsula open to the invaders.
North
of the Pyrenees in Septimania,
Roderic’s rival King Agila II (711-14 AD) had been able to survive the Moorish
invasion. Based on the distribution of
Agila’s coinage, it seems that Agila’s influence was limited to the northeast,
chiefly the provinces of Septimania
and Tarraconensis. Agila’s rule was
stable enough to secure the throne for his son Ardo, who succeeded him in 714
AD and held out until the Muslims pushed north across the Pyrenees in 721 AD, when
he was finally defeated. Apparently, the Goths of Septimania made no attempt to
negotiate with the invaders. Cities like
Nîmes and Carcassonne managed to hold out against the invaders well into 725
AD.
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Moorish troops with captives, Cantigas de Santa Maria, 13th C. AD |
Pelagius,
(Pelayo in Spanish), son of Fafila, dux of Gallaetia, leader of the last and most prominent of the Gothic
remnants, established the strong Kingdom of Asturias in the north, ruling it from 718 AD until his death in 737 AD. Through his victory over the Moors at the
Battle of Covadonga in 722 AD, he is traditionally credited with beginning the
Reconquista.
The
difficult terrain and remoteness of Asturias definitely aided his cause
greatly, but he also benefited from being a secondary target anyway. Eastern Iberia, and ultimately France, offered
far more interesting opportunities than the isolated mountain hold-out Pelagius
had created. When a long famine, which
began in 750 AD, caused many Andalusi to leave for North Africa, the Christian
King Alfonso I (r. 739-57 AD) of Asturias saw his chance to establish some
fortified outposts in the Duero plains in this period and to raid even further
south.
Pacification
The
Cordillera Central marked the most northerly limits of Muslim occupation in the
western half of the peninsula. Coimbra, Coria, Talavera, Madrid, Guadalajara
and Medinaceli were all frontier settlements; the position of the frontier would
hardly change for three centuries. To
the north of these settlements, the land seems to have been almost completely
uninhabited, except by wandering shepherds. The southernmost outposts of Christian settlements
were places like León and Astorga.
In
the East the frontier presented a different picture. Here the Muslim settlement pressed up to and
into the Pyrenees: Pamplona, Tudela, Huesca, Girona and Narbonne were in Muslim
hands. Only in Narbonne, taken by
Charles Martel’s son Pippin III in 759 AD, was their rule challenged. The northern outposts of Muslim settlement
would remain intact until well into the twelfth century.
In
general, the Muslims offered generous terms, which certainly made surrender a
more attractive option, whereas unsuccessful resistance could lead to death. Theodemir, comes
of Baetica in the south, who had been
defeated in open battle in 713 AD, was able to negotiate a treaty with the
invaders. Still firmly possessing the
vital cities, he forced the Muslims to accept his rule over the province. Of course, Theodemir was a subordinate to the
Emir of al-Andalus, but the
independence of the province lasted until the 780s AD, maybe even longer, and
thus survived his death by at least forty years. Because of this treaty, Theodemir’s region
would be known by the Muslims as “Tudmīr” for centuries afterwards.
In
the later phases of the conquest, many Visigothic lords in the Ebro valley were
allowed to retain their lands and status and soon converted to Islam. Converts from Christianity to Islam came from
two categories. The first group came from the aristocracy and influential
families, who saw political advantages in joining with the new rulers. Amongst the best known of these are the Banū
Qasi (the Sons of Cassius) of Tudela, and the Banū ‘Amrūs of Huesca, who formed
dynasties which dominated the area for two centuries after he Muslim conquest. Cassius was a nobleman ruling over some
territory on the northern Ebro. His move
secured his reign, that of his son Fortunus and of further descendants. Still in the tenth century, the Banū Qasi
proudly claimed their Gothic ancestry ruling over a by then rather large
territory.
Far
more numerous were converts amongst the “normal” Visigothic or Hispano-Roman
Christians, who typically occupied low positions in the social hierarchy. Most Christians, however, retained their old
faith, though many adopted Muslim customs and learned Arabic, giving rise to
the term Mozarabs (Spanish mozárabes
from Arabic musta’rib), meaning
“Arabised ones”.
As
was the case with the Visigoths, the Muslims never constituted a large part of
the Iberian population. Whereas by 750
AD there were perhaps some 30,000 Muslims in the peninsula, the Iberian
population at the time is estimated at anywhere from four to eight million. However, conversions to Islam later added to
this number.
Unlike
in the rest of the Islamic world, the conquerors did not inhabit certain
garrison towns. Instead, settlement
seemed to have been haphazard and determined by the interests of the settlers
rather than by any overall scheme. Moreover,
the conquerors settled down as property owners, marrying the daughters of the
previous Visigothic owners, as when ΄Abd al-΄Aziz bin Mūsā married Roderic’s widow,
and when Sara, granddaughter of Wittiza, married two Arab husbands in succession and founded a dynasty which produced, among
others, the tenth-century historian Ibn al-Qutiya.
As
a result, the Andalusi Muslim invaders do not seem to have received the aţā (pension) that soldiers normally
received in early Muslim society. This
also meant that there was no need for an elaborate bureaucracy to service and
process the lists of those entitled to pensions. Córdoba (Qurtuba in Arabic), with its rich agricultural hinterland, abundant
mineral resources and its dense population of Muslims, became the capital in
about 716 AD.
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Slave market |
Moorish settlements
On
the whole, the Arabs settled in the main cities and the fertile irrigated areas
of the Guadalquivir valley, the Levante around Murcia and Zaragoza and the
middle Ebro valley. In some places there
were concentrations of men from the same tribes. Other tribes were more dispersed. Apart from the Qaysīs, almost all of them
belonged to the Yemeni group of Arab tribes. Some of these had lived in the steppe lands of
Jordan and southern Palestine, while others came from Yemen proper. Yemen was a land of cities, well-built
villages and carefully tended farms, so that they would have been familiar with
urban and agricultural life. Many of
them were second or third generation immigrants to North Africa and reared in
urban settlements such as Qayrawān.
In contrast to the Arabs, the
Berbers were widely distributed throughout al-Andalus. Many settled in the central Meseta,
Extremadura and the whole of the north and west apart from Zaragoza and its
surroundings. Toledo, Merida and
Valencia lay in areas with a predominantly Berber population. As these lands were less rich and inviting
than the areas settled by Arabs, it has been suggested that the Berbers were
obliged to accept inferior lands. There
is no evidence for this, even though there are indications that the Arabs held the Berbers in
utter contempt.
The Berbers
The
Berbers (from Latin barbari and Greek
βάρβαρoi – barbarians) are the indigenous
inhabitants of North Africa. The Chronicle of 754 AD refers to Berbers as
Mauri (Moors), being the inhabitants
of the three Roman provinces of Mauretania
(modern Morocco and Algeria), whereas the Arabs are called Saraceni. Today, Berbers mostly refer to themselves as Amazigh, Imazighen
or Imaziγens (“the free”) and
speak a language that is quite distinct from Arabic or Indo-European languages.
Whereas both Arabic and Berber belong to
the Hamito-Semitic language group, they constitute different branches. The Berber script is probably based on a
Punic variety of the Phoenician alphabet.
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Modern Libyan Berbers |
The
Berbers were never a homogeneous ethnic or political group, encompassing a
range of cultures and ancestries. The
one unifying force was the Berber language, Berber land and history. Organised in tribes, some were nomadic and
others living in settlements in areas with an agricultural base. Some of them strongly opposed to Arab rule,
others rapidly converted to Islam and became part of the Muslim forces.
According
to Arab sources, at the time of the invasion the Andalusi Berber tribes were
divided into two groups, the Butr and the Barānis. The difference between Butr and Barānis seems
to have had little effect on the politics of al-Andalus, unlike the murderous
disputes between the Arab tribes. Most
of the Berbers who joined the Muslim conquest and settled in al-Andalus, came
from the Butr group. Berber troops
received a share of the booty, but apart from a few exceptions, they do not
seem to have occupied positions of political importance.
The Early Years (714-741 AD)
The
governors (wālīs) of al-Andalus were
in general appointed by the governor of Ifrīqīya in Qayrawān, or sometimes by
the Caliph in person. They were
outsiders to the province with no local power base or following, which did not
always mean that the wishes of the local people were ignored. If the locals did
not like a governor, or if he attempted to undermine their autonomy and
privileged fiscal status, they would write to the caliph, who would then send
them someone who pleased them.
Between
714 and 756 AD al-Andalus was ruled by some twenty wālīs and their short tenures made it almost impossible to quell
rising in-fighting among the various factions of the leadership. Rivalries that had already existed in the
Arabian Peninsula, such as between the Qaysīs/Mudar Arabs and the Yemenite
Kalb, were exported abroad. Factional
frictions and strife in Damascus gave rise to bitter feuds in Iberia as well.
The Arrival of the Syrians
In
740 AD there was an anti-Arab revolt by the Berbers of North Africa, as the
governor of Egypt ‘Ubayd Allāh bin al-Habhāb tried to impose land tax to
increase the revenue required to pay the Syrian army, which was the backbone of
the caliphate. Further fuel was added to
the fire by the practice of taking Berber children for the harems of the
Umayyad elite.
In
a very short period of time the entire Magreb (“the West”) had slipped from the
control of the governors. In response to
the complete defeat of the local forces, the Caliph Hishām recruited a new army
in Syria. On their way to North Africa, the Syrian soldiers were joined
soldiers from Egypt. However, this military expedition against the Berbers was
not a success. The Syrian army was
defeated and the 10,000 survivors fled north to Ceuta in modern Morocco. Cut off from their homelands, they appealed to
the wālī of al-Andalus for help, but
he refused.
Meanwhile,
a similar Berber uprising had started in al-Andalus. The governor of Egypt had appointed ‘Uqba bin
al-Hajjāji as-Salūlī as wālī of al-Andalus
to implement his strict fiscal policies. The Andalusi Arabs were also fiercely
opposed to him and in 740 AD there was a coup
d’état in which as-Salūlī was forced to resign and was replaced by ‘Abd
al-Malik bin Qaţan al-Fihrī, a venerable figure chosen by the people. However,
the change was too late to prevent an uprising. In the autumn of 741 AD, there was a major
Berber revolt in the north-west and the Arabs were driven out of all the lands
north of the Cordillera Central. The
Berbers marched south-west towards Córdoba and al-Fihrī was unable to resist
them effectively.
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Belmez castle near Córdoba, 1245 AD |
Looking
across the Strait of Gibraltar for help, al-Fihrī started to negotiate with the
leader of the Syrians, Balj bin Bishr, who had fled to Ceuta. The Syrians were so desperate that they were
prepared to agree to almost any conditions which would save them. Ibn Bishr accepted that he should fight the Berbers
and then return to North Africa when the work was done. In the spring of 742 AD
the Syrians were finally helped to cross into al-Andalus.
The
battle-hardened Syrians joined the Andalusi Arabs led by al-Fihrī and defeated
the Berbers in a fierce battle near Toledo. However, contrary to the deal made
with al-Fihrī, the Syrians were reluctant to return to North Africa. Relations broke down between Ibn Bishr and al-Fihri
and Ibn Bishr launched a coup, which left the old wālī dead and himself in control. Of
course, this could not go unavenged and the Andalusi Arabs launched a counter-attack
led by two of al-Fihrī’s sons, which left Ibn Bishr mortally wounded in the
battle of Córdoba. Nevertheless, the Syrians remained in control of the city
and chose a new wālī from their own
ranks, who defeated the opposition. Many
Arabs of distinguished lineage were sold as slaves.
Reorganisation
In
743 AD a new wālī, Abū’l-Khaţţar
al-Husām bin Dirār al-Kalbī, a member of the Kalb tribe, one of the leading
Yemenite tribes of Syria, was sent from Qayrawān, apparently in response to a
petition from al-Andalus of all parties who wanted peace. Having
first secured the release of the Arab and Berber captives, he set about
providing for the Syrians who now clearly had to be accommodated in al-Andalus.
Al-Kalbī settled the Syrians in a methodical way, each jund (army, based on tribal origins) in a different area. The jund
of Damascus was settled in Elvira,
the jund of Jordan in Rayyu (Málaga
and Archidona), the jund of Palestine
in Medina Sidonia, the jund of Hims
in Seville and Niebla, and the jund of
Qinnasrīn in Jaén. The jund of Egypt, possibly the largest, was
divided between the Algarve (from al-Garb:
”Where the sun sets”) in the west and Murcia in the east.
It
is said that the Syrians were given a third of the property of the local people
to live off, though it is not clear whether revenues or actual lands to
cultivate are meant. The junds were obliged to pay the government
a fixed sum from the revenues they collected. In exchange for this livelihood, the Syrians had
to do military service.
Discord
Unfortunately,
the short period of peace would be disturbed as the Caliph Walid II in Damascus
was murdered in 744 AD, which automatically led to a revolt against al-Kalbī,
his appointee in al-Andalus. Being an outsider to al-Andalus with no power-base
of his own, al-Kalbī was led to rely on and favour the Andalusi Yemenis. The Qaysīs would not tolerate a governor who
favoured their hated rivals and they chose the hard-bitten, brutal and
fanatical as-Sumayl bin Hātim al-Kilābī as their new leader.
War
could no longer be avoided. The Qaysīs were fewer in number, but stronger in
the Córdoba area. Al-Kilābī set out to divide his enemies and managed to win
over the leader of the Yemeni tribes which had been settled in Syria for a long
time and may have felt more in common with other Syrians than with the Yemeni
tribes of South Arabia. The coalition
revolted in April 745 AD and after two years of civil war, the rebels were
finally able to eliminate al-Kalbī and his supporters. Tawāba bin Yazīd, one of the original leaders
of the revolt, was proclaimed the new governor. On Ibn
Yazīd’s death from natural causes in the following year, authority passed to Yūsuf
bin ‘Abd ar-Rahmān, most probably another leader of the revolt against al-Kalbī.
Change
The
events of 741-43 AD had profoundly changed the political character of Muslim
Iberia. It substantially increased the
Arab, and especially the Syrian, element in the population, particularly in
those rural areas in the south, which were to be the heartland of al-Andalus
for centuries to come. Many Syrians, who came from Syria and the steppe lands
of Mesopotamia in northern Iraq, had long-standing loyalty to the ruling
Umayyad family.
A
significant number of probably non-Arab native Syrians or prisoners of war from
other regions of the Muslim empire arrived. These had no tribal affiliations and were mawālī (“clients or freedmen”) of the
Umayyad family, owing their loyalty only to the ruling dynasty. Their presence would prove vital to the later
success of the Umayyads in establishing themselves as rulers in al-Andalus.
In
January 747 AD an outside candidate, Yūsuf bin ‘Abd ar-Rahmān al-Fihrī, was put
forward by al-Kilābī, which was a shrewd choice. Yūsuf al-Fihrī was already an old man and al-Kilābī
could expect him to be a pliable instrument. Al-Fihrī’s tribe the Quraysh (the Prophet’s tribe)
had always occupied an intermediate position somewhat outside tribal divisions
and could hope to attract loyalty from all parties. In addition, the family had good contacts with
the Berber groups.
Al-Fihrī
started to exercise his power by excluding Yemenis from important positions. When in 755 AD Zaragoza was besieged by Yemeni
Arabs supported by dissident Berbers, however, al-Fihrī was powerless to help
and Zaragoza was only saved by an expedition of Qaysī volunteers from the
south. When some of al-Fihrī’s forces had proceeded
towards Pamplona, where Basque raids had been reported, they were defeated. The old governor could not come to their
assistance, for at this point a certain ΄Abd ar-Rachmān bin Mu’āwiya of the Umayyad family had landed from Africa, and al-Fihrī had to hurry south, only to face the subsequent establishment of the
Umayyad emirate in al-Andalus.
Under
the newcomer ΄Abd ar-Rachmān Iberia would be the first region in the hitherto
politically united “Arab Empire” to break decisively free from the secular
authority of the caliphs in Damascus in 756 AD.
Arms and Armour of the Muslims
The
nomadic desert Arabs had long been known to the peoples of Syria and Persia as
fierce and warlike hit and run raiders, mounted upon fast horses or
dromedaries. With little or no armour at all, they carried hide shields and
were armed with spear, straight sword, and bow and arrows. Much of their equipment, particularly armour, was
acquired by looting settlements and forts on the northern borders of their
domain.
Little
is known about the first Umayyad contingents that crossed the Strait of
Gibraltar in 711 AD. We do know that the
vast majority was infantry. Logistic
difficulties prevented the transfer of large cavalry units and mounted troops consisted
only of a few light units, armed with spear and bow, riding without stirrups.
Berber
soldiers were dressed in a turban, which covered most of the head, a tunic,
wide trousers and a large woollen or cotton cloak (haik), which was wrapped around the body. The clothing was mostly all in the same (dark)
colour. They were equipped with a spear,
javelins, a sling with stones, a short sword, – usually carried on the back – a
leather cuirass, cork-soled sandals and a small round leather or wooden shield.
Before
battle, many Berbers shaved their heads in a purification ritual. Arab soldiers had adopted the North African
dress code, but usually wore a cuirass, sword and oblong shield, in line with
the Middle Eastern heavy infantry trends of that time.
Armour
Though
early Islamic sources treat the coat of mail (dir’) as a standard piece of military equipment, which could be
worn under a cloak (qabā’) to
disguise it, probably only Berber and Arab officers had coats of mail or some
other type of armour, with helmets of Byzantine origin. Otherwise, for most soldiers this type of body
armour would have been rare, as it was quite expensive. They would have worn leather or felt padded
armour or none at all.
Records
show that in 706 AD coats of mail were sold for 700 dirhams, while spears and shields fetched between 50 and 70 dirhams.
There are also references to the practice of wearing two coats of mail (dir’ayn), the one under being shorter or
even made of fabric or leather.
Helmets
The
conical bayda-helmet is described by a
contemporary Arab as “a helmet of iron
which is composed of plates like the bones of the skull, the edges whereof are
joined together with nails; and sometimes of one piece”. This description is confirmed by some of the
surviving Byzantine and Sassanid examples. By Umayyad times, the conical helmet was
forged in one piece. Lamellar armour
probably came with the Turkish invasion in 1163-91 AD.
![]() |
Helmet with neckguard, from Al.Sufi's Kitab al-Sufar, 1224 AD |
Tapering
helmets were considered typically Turkish. Sometimes helmets had nose-pieces,
but in general, nose-guards were unusual.
Another common feature was the mighfar,
either an aventail, consisting of a piece of mail or fabric attached to the rim
of the helmet, or a mail coif or hood hanging down behind to protect the neck. More commonly, at least in the early period,
it was a mail hood covering the top as well as the sides and back of the head. The helmet would be put over the mighfar, which would hang down upon the
shoulders.
Shields
Shields
were worn by both cavalry and infantry, though in many illustrations figures
are shown without them. They seem to have been small disks made of wood or
leather and were certainly less than a metre in diameter.
Swords
The
main offensive weapon was the straight, hilted sword (sayf), typically hung from a baldric as in early Roman fashion.
There seems to be no evidence of the curved sword or scimitar, though Khurāsāni
soldiers from eastern Persia in the early ninth century are said to have had
curved scabbards.
The
best swords came from India (hindī swords),
followed by those made in Indian fashion in Yemen, which, along with Syria and Khurāsān,
was the most famous centre of manufacture. The best steel seems to have come from Sri
Lanka, though that may have simply been the entrepôt for metal imported from
further east.
Yemeni
swords sold between 50 and 100 dinars, whereas at the bottom of the market,
Egyptian swords could be had for just 10 dirhams. Surviving examples of early Islamic swords are
few in number and difficult to date. A number
discovered in northern Iran have straight blades, 100 cm in length, apparently
without hand guards.
Horse-armour and Stirrups
Stirrups
were not used in the Middle East or Europe until the seventh century and there
is no reason to suppose that they were known to the Muslims at the time of the
early conquests. Early stirrups were made of leather (loop-stirrups) or wood
and broke easily. Heavy
cavalry mounts were protected with felt barding, while their riders wore coifs
and hauberks and were armed with maces, straight swords and large daggers. To better stabilise these heavier warriors on
their horses, the leather loop-stirrups were replaced by metal ones.
Whereas
in the ninth century it was widely believed that iron stirrups were a new
invention, we know that in south-western Iran they had already been in use at
the end of the seventh century.
Spears and Maces
Early
Muslim spears (rumh, plural rimāh) almost always appear as an
infantry weapon. For want of stirrups, cavalry
duels were typically fought with swords. Mounted shock combat was not executed by heavy
lancers, but consisted of charges with sword and light lance.
Spears
were thrusting weapons with an iron point often used with devastating effect
against cavalry charges. In infantry
encounters, before the fighting closed to sword length, early Muslim spearheads
with long edged blades were used for slashing from side to side as well as
thrusting straight ahead.
Javelins
(harba, plural hirāb) were short with a long blade and were mainly used as a
symbol of authority to be carried before a caliph or governor. Together with spears, iron maces or bars were
typical shock weapons.
Bows
Archers
mostly fought on foot during the Umayyad and early ‘Abbasid periods. From the ninth century, however, the mounted
archer largely replaced the footman and became the backbone of the forces of
the caliphate. Abbasid generals
increasingly used Khurāsāni and Turkish horse archers protected by leather
cuirasses and round leather shields and armed with lance and short composite
bow.
Though
archery formed an important part of Muslim warfare, we know little of the bows
(qaws, plural aqwās) and arrows of the early Muslim period. There seems to have been a division between
the lighter Arab and the heavier, more effective Persian bow, though it is not
clear that there was any difference in design or construction.
The
leather or wooden quiver is described as a quiver with a broad open top which
tapers towards the bottom, so that when arrows are put in point downward their
feathers are not damaged. The length of
a bowshot is put by the majority of lexicographers as between 180 and 240 m. It is likely that the soldiers from
Transoxania introduced a shorter composite bow like the type from Seljuk and
Mongol times.
Arab Military Organisation and Tactics
There
was no “Umayyad army”, but rather a number of different armies at different
times and places. The most important army was the Syrian army (jund as-Shām – army of The Levant).
Warriors
were supposed to provide their own arms and there seems to have been little
difference between cavalry and infantry equipment. Although the caliphs regarded the settled and
urban Arabs as a more reliable source for troops, regular payment of the
nomadic Bedouin (badawiyyūn)
helped to
settle and control them more easily. It
also creamed off the best fighting men so that rebellions were less of a
threat.
A
notable feature of the Muslim conquest was the founding of new garrison-towns. The
first of these garrisons were known as amsars
and many would develop into major cities.
Payment
Armies
were maintained at the expense of the rest of the population by levying taxes.
Non-Muslims paid a heavier tax rate, but were excused military service. Next to a monthly pay (aţā), active soldiers
were also rewarded by the booty (ghanīma) won by a man himself and the official
share of spoils distributed by the government (fay). Aţā stipends as well as military duties were inherited by a man’s
son.
Ultimately,
the pay structure was based on irafa
units, in which men were grouped according to function and status, each irafa receiving a sum to be distributed
amongst its members.
Organisation
The
last Umayyad Caliph, Marwan II (d. 750 AD), is credited with standardising his
army, breaking up the conventional line of battle, usually 5 men deep and
composed of unequal tribal contingents, and sub-dividing his forces into
smaller units. The smallest unit was the
saff al-maqatir, consisting of 16
spear armed infantry or 8 archers. The usbah was always composed of 32 men (2
infantry or 4 archers groups). The miqnab had 64 men, the kardus 128, the jahfal 256, the kabkabah
512, the zumrah 1,024, the taifah 2048, the jash 4,096, the khamis
8,192 and the al-askar al-azam
16,384. Phil
Barker notes that this system was probably directly derived from the old
Macedonian system and may never have been used in practice. Each unit would have included heavy infantry,
light infantry archers and heavy cavalry lancers. Also a purely mounted force could be arranged
in squadrons to give more flexibility. The kardus was considered the most
appropriate tactical unit for cavalry emerging from ambush.
Other
units, which seem incompatible with the Macedonian system, were the khamsah (5 horsemen), ashrah (10-20 horse), tablikhanah (80), and alf (1,000 horse). The katibah
consisted of 500-800 infantry and the faylaq
of 5,000. The
urafā (singular arīf) were in charge of ten to fifteen men and were responsible for
assembling and paying the men, but not for leading them in battle. The urafā
were also used as a military police in that they had to screen the men for
their loyalty to the caliph. They did
not belong to the tribal elites and may have been employed precisely to
restrict the authority the tribal nobility.
Officials
whose function it was to count the number of troops and to make sure that all
the men were at their battle-stations were called urād (singular: ārid). These officials also decided who was fit to
fight and to have their names recorded in the diwān (here: payroll).
Turkish
influences grew in the ninth century as junds
were augmented with ghulām (plural ghilmān, “pages”, originally largely
used for menial tasks, but also occasionally armed and sent into battle). Later
these ghilmān, purchased as slave
children, were trained and converted to Islam and would serve the Abbasid
caliphs as their personal bodyguard. Ghulām heavy cavalry would be the finest
in the Muslim world, marrying elements of steppe warfare (use of lasso and bow
from horseback) with those of Arab lance and sword.
Tactics
The
early Muslim armies relied on razzia
tactics learned in Arabia. The strategy
was to weaken a foe with raids before a more serious attack or invasion. Moreover, in the early days horses were too
valuable to be used in frontal assaults. Instead, the cavalry were reserved for
flanking manoeuvres or to attack broken infantry. In
the early Muslim armies, the distinction between infantry and cavalry was
blurred: the cavalry often fought on foot, while the infantry was transported
on camels and horses to meet the enemy. Mounts
enabled them to travel more quickly to the scene of battle and to conduct
reconnaissance expeditions. Muslim
infantry fought in the Byzantine fashion, placing better-armoured foot-soldiers
in the front. Unlike Byzantine horsemen, however, Muslim cavalry would dismount
and fight as infantry, using their lances as pikes. Armies
were conventionally drawn up for battle in lines, with a centre, a left and a
right wing. Lines could be straight or
crescent-shaped, with the wings advanced and the centre further back. The cavalry would be on the left and right
wings and the infantry in the centre, lined up in three ranks: one with swords,
one with spears and one with archers.
A
line could also be curved with the centre advanced and the wings behind. This was considered the worst variety and
should be reserved only for cases of dire necessity. In this case two squadrons of horse should be deployed
to support the centre.
Commanders
usually stationed themselves at the centre. Curiously, they often chose to command sitting
down, either on a carpet or on a chair. This
way of command may reflect Sassanid practice, but could also have been
practical in that a stationary commander is easier for his subordinates to find
than one who is dashing all over the battlefield.
Generally
speaking, many conflicts started with the initial skirmishing between cavalry,
whereas the decisive encounters were between foot soldiers, fighting first with
long spears and later at close quarters with drawn swords. After the battle had reached the close combat
stage it was difficult for any commander to have much control over the course
of events. In the hand-to-hand fighting
it was the small groups gathered around their banners which were the real
fighting units, men from the same tribe or locality who knew each other and who
were prepared to die with each other.
The
infantry spear wall to defeat a cavalry charge became a common practice in the
warfare of the Marwanid period (684-750 AD). The infantry would kneel down pointing their
spears at the enemy until it was almost on them. Then they would rise and thrust their spears,
advancing steadily against the opponent. The ability of the Syrian troops to act in
this fashion in the face of an oncoming cavalry charge is a sign of training
and professionalism. It was this discipline
and training which gave them the advantage over enthusiastic but disorganised
armies. The
most striking example of the effectiveness of these tactics comes from the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate,
at the Battle of Tell Kushaf, when the ‘Abbāsid troops under ‘Abd Allāh bin
‘Alī acted exactly in this way to defeat Marwān II’s army.
The next
instalment of this series will focus on the consolidation of Muslim power in Iberia
Sources and Further Reading
- Armstrong, Karen, Islam, A Short History, Phoenix Paperback, Orion Publishing Group, London, 2001
- Barker, Phil and Richard Bodley Scott, DBM Army Lists 2,WRG, Devizes, 1998
- Carey, Brian Todd, Road to Manzikert, Byzantine and Islamic Warfare 527-1071, Pen and Sword, Barnsley, UK, 2012
- Collins, Roger, The Arab Conquest of Spain, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK, 1989, 1994
- Collins, Roger, Caliphs and Kings (796-1031), Wiley- Blackwell, Chichester, UK 2012
- DESPERTA FERRO, No 7, Al Andalus, de la conquista a la quiebra del califato, Desperta Ferro Ediciones, SLNE, Madrid, 2011
- Al-Andalus, Orto y ocaso de un Estado militarizado, Francisco García Fitz
- La batalla de Poitiers, Philippe Sena
- La supervivencia de los reinos cristianos, José Sánchez-Arcilla
- El guerrero andalusí, Yeyo Balbás
- Un ejército al servicio del califa , ۢۢAbd-al-Rahmān III y su política military, Vergilio Martínez Enamorado
- Yihad durante el califato de al-Andalus, Cristina de la Puente
- Tolerancia, convivencia y coexistencia en al-Andalus, ¿mito o realidad?, Alejandro García Sanjuán
- Las campaňas de Almanzor, Xavier Ballestín Navarro
- Fletcher, Richard, Moorish Spain, Orion Books Ltd., London, 2001
- Kennedy, Hugh, Muslim Spain and Portugal, Longman, London & New York, 1996
- Kennedy, Hugh, The Armies of the Caliphs, Routledge, Abingdon & New York, 2001
- MEDIEVAL WARFARE, Volume I, Issue 3:
- Iván Gimenez, The Rise of the Saracens
- Murray Dahm, Arab Sources on the Conquest of al-Andalus, lberto Raúl Esteban Ribas, The Battle of Guadalete
- Kai Grundmann, The fracture, downfall and remnants of the Visigothic Kingdom
- David Balfour, A Turning Point for Europe and Islam
- Gareth Williams, Fortifications of Western Europe, 700-1100 AD, Karawansaray Publishers Luxembourg, 2011
- Nicolle, David, Armies of the Muslim Conquest, Men-at-Arms 255, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 1993, 2008
- Nicolle, David, The Moors - The Islamic West, 7th-15th Centuries AD, Men-at-Arms 348, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2001
- Nicolle, David, Armies of the Caliphates 862-1098, Men-at-Arms 320, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 1998
- O’Callaghan, Joseph F., A History of Medieval Spain, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1983
- Phillips, William D. Jr. and Carla Rahn Phillips, A Concise History of Spain, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010
- Russell Robinson, H., Oriental Armour, Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, New York, 1967, 1995
- Slingshot No. 55, A Medieval Arab Military Manual, Phil Barker, pp. 13-16, September 1974
- Slingshot No. 99, Origins of the Mamluk Military Institution, John Feilla, pp. 11-2, January 1982